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‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’
Abstract
In the postcolonial nation state that is India, cinema has become an important tool for propagating the idea of
nationalism. In recent times, one of the most controversial components of Hindu nationalism has been the
hate campaign against what is termed as ‘love-jihad’, which is deployed as a weapon to mobilize, polarize, and
communalize citizens. The Indian Hindi-language film industry, popularly known as Bollywood, has also
become a controversial site. In this paper, I argue that if ‘Indian nationalism’ is to be represented as ‘Hindu
nationalism’ and ‘Indian culture’ as ‘Hindu culture,’ it logically follows that this majoritarian construction
needs the minority ‘Other’ to reinforce this notion of nationalism and culture. To make my point, I shall
critically look at the representation of Muslims in contemporary Bollywood films. My analysis deploys
Edward Said’s notion of representation and knowledge as imbricated in issues of power, class, and materiality.
Using Said’s theoretical framework of Orientalism, this paper elucidates how specific popular Bollywood films
in the historical genre have dealt with the liminality of the Muslim ‘Other’ in the nation-space by either
representing Muslims in stereotypical ways or by vilifying their image. This paper adopts the textual analysis
method (that is, it reads the films as texts). I posit that the representation of Muslims in Bollywood films could
be divided into two broad segments: representation of Muslims in the context of ‘love-jihad’ and the effect of
‘love-jihad’ on Bollywood.
Keywords
‘Love-Jihad’, Hindi cinema, Muslim as Other, Hindu nationalism, terrorism, identity
Author Notes
Nadira Khatun is an Assistant Professor at Xavier school of Communication, Xavier University Bhubaneswar.
She obtained her PhD in 2016 from Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India. Her research is on
‘Imagining “Muslim” Identity: An Interpretive Study of Hindi Cinema’. She completed her M.Phil
(2008–2010) on ‘Electronic Media and Public Issues: A Study of Mediation’ in School of Media and Cultural
Studies, Tata Institute of Social Science, Mumbai. Her research interests are Muslim identity, film studies,
popular culture, Indian cinema and media representation.
This article is available in Journal of Religion & Film: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss3/8
Bollywood1 has become one of the most important platforms for the cultural 
production of narratives in South Asia. As the dominant media outlet, it plays a 
crucial role in projecting certain ideological discourses such as nationalism, 
communalism, and secularism. Hindi 2  films, just as other films, construct an 
imaginary notion of the past in the light of the contemporary socio-political 
situation. Therefore, that Islam has played an important role in contemporary Indian 
religious politics has also been reflected in Indian cinema in the last two decades. 
One of the most controversial contemporary issues of religious politics is ‘love-
jihad’3  and its impact is quite evident in Bollywood. This paper explores the 
depiction of women and Muslims in the complex representational scheme and in 
the reception of two films, Jodhaa Akbar4 and Padmaavat,5 and looks at them as 
being products of complex historical, cultural, and political nation-building projects 
in which gender plays a central role. First and foremost, we need to understand the 
connection between gender and Hindu nationalist discourse.  
 
Gendering the Politics of Hindu Nationalism 
 Gender became a very important component of the nationalist discourse 
from the colonial period. Depending on the nation’s political scenario, gender, 
especially that of women, has been used as a tool to strengthen the nationalist 
political discourse since the time of the anti-colonial movement. Sometimes the 
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image and ‘plight’ of women are used to awaken the collective conscience of the 
nation, while at other times it is made a tool for gaining political power.  
 
Locating Nationalism and the Position of Women 
 Before discussing the term ‘nationalism’ we need to understand the concept 
of the ‘nation.’ A ‘nation’ is defined by political geographic boundaries. Kelly J. 
Bell opined that ‘Nationalism’ is the belief that focuses on the ongoing support for 
that geographical boundary, and people visualize the boundary to be separated from 
the other nations of the world.6 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the 
definition of nationalism is “loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially a sense of 
national consciousness … exalting one nation above all others and placing primary 
emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other 
nations or supranational groups.”7   Bell further mentioned, “Nationalism is an 
ideology that focuses both on loyalty to and pride in one’s nation…. Nationalism, 
at its core, instills a belief in citizens that their country is important and superior to 
other countries, and their individual identity is strongly tied to their homeland.”8  
During colonial rule in India, nationalism became an important ideology used to 
motivate and instigate people for the cause of freedom.  
In the colonialist and nationalist discourses, women directly or indirectly 
played an important role. The subaltern position of Indian women enabled the 
British to justify imperialism as a ‘civilizing mission’ in which they were rescuing 
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Indian women from the reprehensible practices of a traditional Hindu patriarchal 
society. We must also reflect upon the historical details of the manner in which the 
‘civilizing mission’ came to be determined. The ‘woman question’ in the agenda of 
social reform in the early 19th century was not much about the specific condition of 
women within a determinate set of social relations. Lata Mani rightly pointed out 
in her study of abolition of sati-daha,9 that even later, the agenda of the ‘woman 
question’ was produced by post colonialist discourses.10 
In connection to that, nationalism was not only a political struggle of power, 
rather, it related to the question of the political independence of a nation in virtually 
every aspect of the material and spiritual lives of its citizens. Partha Chatterjee, a 
prominent post-colonial theorist, provided a theoretical framework11 for analyzing 
the contradictory pulls on nationalist ideology in its struggle against dominant 
colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. In brief, this 
resolution was built around a splitting of the domain of culture into two spheres—
the material and the spiritual. Within the material sphere may be included the claims 
of Western civilization that its culture was superior and most powerful because of 
its reliance on science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, and 
modern methods of statecraft. It was believed that these had given the European 
countries the strength to subjugate non-European people. To overcome this 
domination, the colonized people of India had to imitate the Western material 
aspect of life; however, it was assumed that Indians did not have to rely on the 
3
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Western spiritual sphere as the spiritual domain of the East was superior to that of 
the West. Nationalists asserted that European powers failed to colonize the inner, 
that is, superior spiritual culture of the colonized. This in turn led to the ascribing 
of gender roles in our society. Material interest in the outer world was thought to 
be the masculine realm of society, and the inner world, that is, the spiritual, was 
considered to be the feminine domain.  
As women were thought to be situated in the sacred spiritual space, thus, 
during the anti-colonial period, it was easier to make people imagine that gender, 
especially womanhood, was of primary importance in the embodiment of the 
nation. Consequently, women have been used as a symbol of national identity from 
the time of India’s freedom movement. The fact that national identity was 
constructed in gendered terms is apparent in the use of feminine nouns to address 
the nation, such as ‘she’ or ‘motherland’ to refer to the country. The most ideal 
image of the country was as Mother India, depicted as a goddess modestly dressed 
in a sari, seated on a lion, and holding a saffron flag.12  
It is argued by numerous scholars such as Sikata Banerjee,13 Kelly J. Bell,14 
and Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi15 that religious politics created a space for 
women to participate in the political discourse during the pre-Independence days. 
It can also be argued that Hindu women are represented as the “repositories of the 
religious beliefs and the keepers of purity and integrity of the Hindu community.”16 
If it is true that religious politics has created opportunities for women to become a 
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part of the public space, it can equally be argued that it has simultaneously 
undermined women’s autonomy17; the identity of women has been reduced to 
‘mother,’ ‘daughter,’ and ‘sister,’ whose honour should be protected by the male 
members of the community. Also, it should be mentioned that only a small 
percentage of women got the opportunity to participate in the nation’s political 
discourse. Thus, we see that Hindu nationalist discourse legitimizes the dominance 
of men over women.  
We must focus on another perspective to understand gender roles in the 
nationalist discourse. Initially, nationalism and its ideas gained popularity among 
the elite but it needed mass support for its wider propagation. Historically, ideals 
of nationalism were inclusive of various religions, races, and languages; later, 
however, nationalism drew on the idea of unification of diverse groups to form a 
new community of citizens. According to historian Romila Thapar, there were, and 
are, nationalist ideologies where an individual group identity is prioritized as 
opposed to a secular nationalist discourse. For example, there are concepts of 
nations based on a single exclusive identity: religious, linguistic, ethnic and similar 
singular identities. Prominent historian Romila Thapar has christened this 
phenomenon as ‘pseudo-nationalism’ which exaggerates the importance of a single 
history of one religious community as being the pre-eminent history of the nation 
and which denigrates and distorts the history of other communities.  She went 
further to suggest that such ideals “should be precluded from being called 
5
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nationalism.”18  We can also argue, women only find a place as tools in the hands 
of men. In essence women, as subjects, are excluded from the concept of 
nationalism except as being carriers of abstract notions of honour. In this respect 
their exclusion can be compared to the way in which Muslims as ‘Others’ are 
excluded from the project of nationalism. 
In the post-Independence period, India experienced Partition and many 
communal riots across the country. Those historical traumas, such as the violence 
of Partition, experiences of permanent exile, and sufferings due to communal 
violence heightened the feeling for non-Muslims of being threatened by Muslims 
during the traumatic events of 1947. The identity of the Muslim ‘Other’ gained 
ground during British rule due to the colonial policy of divide and rule and later 
due to the partitioning of India and the creation of Pakistan. Moreover, the 
vilification of Muslim rulers in India originated during colonial times through the 
writings of British historians. The notion of ‘Otherness’ has become more 
complicated in the last two decades after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in the 
country. In connection to this, Thapar has also pointed out that a version of history 
is currently being written by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha [RSS] 19  and 
Hindutva ideologues for whom the past has only to do with Hindu history of the 
early period and the victimization of Hindus under Muslim tyranny in the medieval 
period. During the 1990s, the narrative of communal violence began to be reframed 
in terms of allegations of the abductions of Hindu women by Muslim men during 
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Partition. This approach was adopted and became the central theme because 
protecting the honour of Hindu women served as an important tool to mobilize 
citizens.  
“At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Hindu right-
wing groups effectively launched various campaigns to mobilize and gain popular 
support; a support that was primarily garnered through anti-Muslim propaganda.”20  
At that time, the most successful of these campaigns was the Ayodhya movement.21  
Along with communal mobilization, the new emerging political discourse, i.e. 
Hindutva, also justified the inferior situation of women in the patriarchal system. 
As a result, Hindutva politics tried to justify the sati22 of Roop Kanwar23 in 1987 
by seeking justification for the act of sati in religious Hindu scriptures and by 
idealizing a woman’s role as a dutiful wife. Hindu nationalist discourse teaches 
women to accept the ideals of traditional gender hierarchy. It is believed that “if 
women do not perform their cultural role in a proper manner, then the family suffers 
and then the nation.”24  Therefore, if someone dares defy the representation of 
women as presented under patriarchy, it is assumed as a disregard for the Hindu 
woman and the person is believed to be the enemy of the family and, by extension, 
the nation. Hindutva ideology thus inspires Hindu women to think not in terms of 
individual rights but rather in terms of collective interest in order to form the ideal 
nation, most specifically, a Hindu nation. “The gender ideology of Hindutva, a 
factor that touches the very essence of Hindu nationalism, reinforces the 
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‘supremacy of the family over the individual’ with the implication that ‘family 
considerations should reign supreme,’ not only in marriage, but in ‘career’.”25  This 
entire concept was reinforced by deploying the image of Hindu goddesses to 
promote the ideal of the Indian female by appealing to religious sentimentality. 
Sita’s26 chastity was one of the most popular stories which was referenced multiple 
times by the RSS. 
As already discussed, nationalism refers to the feeling of oneness or unity. 
There can be different kinds of threats which try to break the feeling of oneness or 
being united. This threat can either be in the form of physical violence against 
national borders or in the form of psychological violence perpetrated by challenging 
the normative values or the gender status quo of the nation state. Just as the threats 
can break down the feeling of oneness, they can also help in creating a bond within 
the community to counter the enemy. Following this point, I argue that the fear of 
psychological violence is instilled in people to strengthen the feeling of oneness, 
and the female body is utilized as a component to generate that threat. One of the 
most controversial campaigns that creates such fear is ‘love-jihad’. As we have 
seen that women become active agents in propagating the feeling of nationalism, in 
the next section, I will discuss the concept of how the divine feminine should be 
protected by the male members of our society from being threatened by ‘Others.’  
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Imagining the ‘Divine Feminine’ and the Historical ‘Other’  
 The female body as a social construct has been shaped by the colonial 
discourse of strategic retreats, resistances, and collusions between the colonizer and 
the colonized. The imagination of the nation symbolized by the Hindu female body 
can be traced back to colonial discourses. Scholars such as Asish Nandy,27 Partha 
Chatterjee, 28  Sumathi Ramaswamy, 29  and Charu Gupta 30  have referred to the 
centrality of the symbolic feminine in the imagination of the Indian nation. Women 
became the only inspiration to maintain ethnic identities, “demarcating the 
distinction between the alien and the autochthonal through what their wombs 
brought forth.”31 This discourse imposed “a unique cultural responsibility on the 
Hindu woman, recognizing her as the repository of past freedom and the future 
nationhood.”32 Righteous Hindu women started to symbolize the nation and the 
community from the colonial period. During the anti-colonial movement, the 
nascent nation state was considered a physical entity, i.e. Bharat Maa,33 as mother, 
woman, and goddess.34  Mythological goddesses such as Sati,35 Savitri,36 and Sita 
became the inspiration of the ideal devotional wife committed to virtue and 
conformity. To emphasize Indian values and ethos during the colonial period, a 
nonsexual image of women was presented. Depicted mostly as the “virtuous, 
chaste, submissive, self-sacrificing Hindu woman,” she was “the manager of this 
hearth [and] came to symbolize the incorruptible abode of the nascent nation, ‘who 
had to preserve the Hindu family because the [Hindu] male had already succumbed 
9
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to western colonial power in the material realm’.”37  According to Charu Gupta, 
Hindi literature also went through a gradual shift, from “the erotic Radha of 
medieval poetry to the chaste and virtuous wife and mother extremely restrained 
and bound by propriety.”38  As the woman’s body came to be used symbolically as 
the nation, it was supposed to be protected from outsiders or the ‘Other’ by the male 
members of the community.  M.A. Mubarki writes, “When the woman’s body came 
to represent the nation it became out of bounds for the ‘Other’.”39 He further argues,  
Women’s bodies [were] deemed the repositories of men’s honour, 
the community’s morality, and the nation’s territorial integrity, 
which were subjected to brutal violence both sexual and otherwise, 
since as a symbol of lineage and purity, women’s bodies once 
violated sexually would purportedly designate the entire collectivity 
as dishonoured and shamed.40 
 
Though the identification of Hindu women with the nation’s honour is an early 
nationalist concept, it achieved unprecedented significance only after the rise of 
Hindu nationalist politics. As Hindutva ideology supposes that women have to be 
protected by the male members of society, the ‘love-jihad’ campaign became an 
important tool to propagate that line of thought.  
 
‘Love-jihad’ and Hindu Nationalism 
 In recent times, one of the most controversial issues of Hindu nationalism 
has been ‘love-jihad’. There is a “fake claim by the Hindu right that there is a ‘Love 
Jihad’ organization which is forcing Hindu women to convert to Islam through 
10
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false expressions of love.”41  The propaganda that has been disseminated is that 
some Islamic fundamentalist organizations are funding young Muslim boys so that 
they are able to trap non-Muslim girls to marry them and thus force them to convert 
to Islam. This belief is popularized by organizations such as the RSS, Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad [VHP], Sri Ram Sena, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, and Hindu 
Janjagruthi Samiti. These organisations also utilised the horrifying memories of the 
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the formation of Pakistan and the 
accompanying brutal violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. They tried 
to instil fear through the propagation of stories of how, historically, Hindu women 
were abducted by Muslim men. They have been holding meetings, distributing 
pamphlets, and even filing court cases against Muslim men alleged of luring Hindu 
women to marry them. These right-wing groups have declared that ‘love-jihad,’ as 
a part of an Islamist conspiracy, is a plan for the compulsive and deceitful religious 
conversion of young women by winning over their love. To counter ‘love-jihad,’ 
Ajju Chauhan, state co-convenor of the Bajrang Dal, launched a campaign named 
‘Bahu Laao, Beti Bachao’ 42  in February 2015. The campaign was meant to 
encourage Hindu men to marry non-Hindu women and, on the other hand, to create 
awareness among Hindu women against ‘love-jihad’.  
The case of ‘love-jihad’ has been highlighted and has made its presence felt 
in the visual as well as print media because of its “socio-religio-political movement 
to protect religious sovereignty in India.” 43   Media platforms including social 
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networking sites are flooded with the news of ‘love-jihad’ cases and that has 
undoubtedly posed a threat to the expression of one’s choice of love and raised the 
alarming question of being able to choose religious identity. There are several 
campaigns such as ‘Moral Policing,’ ‘Ghar Wapsi,’ 44 ‘Bahu Lao, Beti Bachao,’ 
‘How to Save Our Women from the Terrorism of Love-Jihad,’ ‘Hindu Auraton ki 
Loot’45 and ‘Love Trishul’46 which were launched to save the honour of Hindu 
women and preserve cohesive community identities and boundaries.   
‘Love-jihad’ also known as ‘Romeo-Jihad’ is considered as part of an 
international Islamist conspiracy; it is alleged that young Muslim men receive funds 
from abroad to purchase “designer clothes, vehicles, mobile phones and expensive 
gifts to woo Hindu women and lure them away … from their home and religion.”47 
Spreading such opinions through campaigns strengthens the pre-existing belief that 
the “body of the Hindu woman has become a site for both claims to community 
homogeneity and honour.”48 These campaigns also undermine the status of women 
in India using the old patriarchal notion that women are not self-sufficient enough 
to make their own decisions. Charu Gupta has mentioned noted Hindi writers such 
as Bharatendu Harishchandra, 49 Pratap Narain Misra, 50  and Radha Charan 
Goswami 51  to explain how these campaigns utilised the history of medieval 
“Muslim rule, which is assumed as the history of chronicle rape and abduction of 
Hindu women.”52 "The same assumption is carried forward that the Muslim men 
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lack morality with high sexual appetites for women’s body, lecherous in behaviours 
with a life of luxury and religious fanaticism.”53 
Along with being used for creating panic and fostering hate to draw sharper 
lines between Hindus and Muslims in India, it can be argued from the above 
analysis that in the contemporary political scenario, women’s bodies have become 
the battleground for playing the political card and spreading falsehood and hatred. 
Women’s bodies are often being presumed as the repository of moral ethics. ‘Love-
jihad’ appears to be a form of violence which attacks religion, gender, and the rights 
of women. Furthermore, the concept of ‘love-jihad’ also tends to seize away the 
right of a woman to choose a partner, while also enforcing religion-imposed choices 
on the bride. Bollywood has always been a platform to represent the socio-political 
situation, and, thus, it caters to the common psyche of the country. We must focus 
on the impact of Hindu nationalism and the love-jihad campaign on Bollywood.  
 
Locating ‘Love-Jihad’ in Bollywood 
 In the postcolonial nation state, films have become an important tool to 
propagate the idea of nationalism. Hindi cinema went through varied shifts in 
response to the socio-political situation of its contemporary times. While the films 
of the 1950s and the 1960s, the so-called Nehruvian54 era, reflected the ‘tolerant’ 
secularism of the state, the 1970s and the 1980s saw the emergence of an alternative 
politics of representing minority Muslims as ‘Other’ and Hindu culture as national 
13
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culture. Though Muslims are always represented as ‘Others’ by portraying them as 
exotic in Bollywood, which was the case even during the so-called secularist 
Nehruvian era, the specific vilification of Muslims only started about three decades 
ago.  At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Hindu right-wing 
movement emerged as a robust presence in India. The Babri Masjid55 demolition 
on 6 December 1992, and the concomitant hardening of communal identities was a 
major turning point in recent Indian history. It was followed by communal riots in 
many parts of India. The demolition of the Babri Masjid and the riots that followed 
became the theme of many memorable films. The divisions in Indian society, 
whether it is sexual, religious, or ethnic identity, have increasingly been more 
apparent in recent years. But, ignoring that fact, Hindi cinema continues to 
prioritize a monolithic image of the nation and portray a “certain essence of 
‘Indianess’”56 termed as ‘Indian culture.’ Such representations are most popular 
among the Indian diaspora. The diasporic communities have an important role in 
forging public culture in India. According to Sunil Khilnani, towards the end of 
1989, a large number of bricks57 were piled up in the pilgrimage town of Ayodhya 
to build the Ram-temple at the disputed site of the erstwhile Babri Masjid. These 
were not ordinary bricks; they were ‘Ram shilas’ or Ram’s bricks collected from 
across India and outside the country. Khilnani points out, “Each was inscribed with 
its place of origin, and among the most proudly displayed were those dispatched by 
emigrant communities in United States, Canada, South Africa and [the] 
14
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Caribbean.”58 The diasporic community provided an eager market for films that 
cater to Hindu religion and culture. Two Bollywood films, Pardes59 and Kabhi 
Khushi Kabhi Gham60 narrate stories of Indian families transported to foreign lands 
and promote Indian culture and rituals “identified as markers of Hindu tradition, 
thereby making any other religion or culture appear ‘Un-Indian’.”61  I argue that if 
there is a need to represent Hindu culture and tradition as a national culture, it is 
obvious that others are represented as either less or differently. Muslims are 
portrayed as ‘Others’ who are trying to harm the nation, while the majoritarian 
community is often represented as the ‘victims.’ Hence, Hindus are projected as the 
norm of the society and Muslims are the disrupters of this norm. The ‘Otherization’ 
of Muslims through cinematic space was mostly done during the last decade of the 
20th and the first decade of the 21st century. 
The deep-seated prejudices in India about Muslims were utilized by the 
Hindutva movements to unite the majoritarian population. The strategy of 
polarizing people was adopted keeping in mind the troubled history of the 
subcontinent. Injecting a deep paranoia about Muslims and their ‘outsideness’ by 
frequent references to medieval Muslim plunderers such as Mamud, the Sultan of 
Gazni, who looted northern India every year, is a popular strategy of Hindutva 
forces. Such scenarios were created by Hindu nationalists in a way that implied that 
the crisis occurred recently.62  Prakash Louis, in his empirical study,63 discusses the 
attempts of the RSS to ‘re-write’ history textbooks in Maharashtra, thereby 
15
Khatun: ‘Love-Jihad’ and Bollywood: Constructing Muslims as ‘Other’
Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 2018
injecting communal consciousness in the minds of the young. There was also a new 
set of films that characterized family values, ‘Indian culture,’ and patriarchy but 
had Muslim characters in minor or supporting roles who were identifiable because 
of their Islamicate culture. In those films, such characters’ identities as Muslims 
took precedence over all other identity markers such as occupation. 
Postcolonial Hindi cinema became one of the platforms to propagate the 
hegemony of the ‘Hindu-ized nation’ which emphasizes the notion of women being 
the symbol of the country. Bollywood has also become a controversial site as some 
film-makers are accused for disseminating the ideology of ‘love-jihad’ through 
their films. Jodhaa Akbar is cited as the initial example of ‘love-jihad.’ Another 
recent and targeted film that is claimed to have promoted ‘love-jihad’ is Bajrangi 
Bhaijaan. 64 As soon as the name of the film was announced, it was wrongly 
assumed by some unknown ‘Hindu fundamentalist’ groups that the film was an 
example of  ‘love-jihad’ where a Muslim boy wooed a Hindu girl. The whole 
controversy started with the word bhaijaan which is generally used to address a 
Muslim man. Actually, the plot concerns a Hindu Brahmin man who faces 
numerous challenges to reunite a Pakistani Muslim girl with her homeland and 
family.  The film was mired in multiple controversies before its release. 
In Gujarat, before the festival of garba,65 VHP leaders started circulating an 
audio clip that targeted Bajrangi Bhaijaan in order to warn Hindus against ‘love-
jihad.’ VHP leaders mentioned, “The audio was created to bring awareness among 
16
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Hindus that such a sinister plan is being executed by the minority community to 
entice young Hindu girls who get smitten by the romanticism in such movies.”66 
They even claimed that the director, Kabir Khan, had been funded by Arab 
countries to make the film to promote the ideology of ‘love-jihad.’ The most recent 
and most targeted film claimed to promote ‘love-jihad’ is Sanjay Leela Bhansali’s 
Padmaavat. In that film, Alauddin Khalji67 is depicted as a cannibalistic, sexually 
depraved, and despotic ruler; this portrayal is a product of the recent socio-political 
developments in the country, where the Muslim man is portrayed as an alien ‘Other’ 
out to violate a brave and virtuous Hindu woman’s ‘honour.’ 
Apart from the films, Bollywood stars, especially the Khans, are accused of 
the charge of ‘love-jihad’ in their real lives. Saif Ali Khan even got death threats at 
the time of his wedding to Kareena Kapoor in 2012 as he was accused for promoting 
‘love-jihad.’ The Hindu Mahasabha has thrown a challenge to the Khans — 
Shahrukh Khan, Amir Khan, and Saif Ali Khan — to be converted to Hinduism if 
they really love their wives. Himalaya Dhwani, a women’s magazine by the VHP, 
used a morphed photo of Kareena Kapoor for its cover page: her face is shown as 
half covered with a niqab,68 with the caption “Conversion of nationality through 
religious conversion.”69 The magazine carried an article that attempted to persuade 
those women who got married to Muslim men to re-convert. As Kareena Kapoor 
married a Muslim man, her picture was used as a tool to promote the campaign.  
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Portrayal of Historical Female Characters as the Nation  
 In this section, I will discuss two female characters—Jodhaa 70  and 
Padmaavati71—and their fictitious portrayal of history in Bollywood to support the 
larger political discourse in present times, as many Indian filmgoers tend to get their 
knowledge of history from such films. On the one hand, we have Jodhaa, a quasi-
historical character about whom very few historical facts are available, who is 
shown as trying to retain her Hindu religious beliefs and values even after her 
marriage with Akbar, a Muslim ruler; on the other hand, we see Padmavati, a 
fictitious character (also known as Rani Padmini) sacrificing her life in fear of 
losing her honor at the hands of the Muslim ruler, Alauddin Khalji. Most 
interestingly, the 19th century witnessed Rani Padmini’s existence in poetry being 
transformed into a ‘fact.’ Colonial writer, Colonel James Tod, Political Agent of 
the English East India Company in Rajputana, “manufactured the enduring 
impression of Indian history as a confrontation between Muslims and Hindus — 
which justified British rule to keep the peace in a land of competing antagonisms.”72  
Later on, the legend of Rani Padmini aka Padmavati was used for anti-colonial 
mobilization in the early 20th century. In Jodhaa Akbar, the Muslim emperor was 
projected as an ideal example due to his tolerant ways as he willingly accepted 
Jodhaa’s cultural superiority.  
Jodhaa Akbar, a period drama, can claim to have a pioneering role in the 
context of portraying communal harmony. The film narrates the story of the 
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romance between Mughal Emperor Jalal-ud-din Muhammad Akbar and the Rajput 
princess Jodhaa Bai, daughter of King Bharmal of Amer. When Akbar plans to 
attack Amer, King Bharmal reluctantly offers his daughter’s hand in marriage to 
the emperor himself to avoid war and strengthen relations between their kingdoms. 
Akbar agrees to the marriage, as such a union would bring forge a truly strong 
alliance and long-lasting peace between the Mughal Empire and the Rajputs.  
Padmaavat is also a period drama. The film is inspired by the eponymous 
epic poem by Malik Muhammad Jayasi. Rani Padmavati, a Rajput queen known 
for her beauty, is the wife of Maharawal Ratan Singh. Sultan Alauddin Khalji hears 
of the legendary beauty of Rani Padmavati and attacks Ratan Singh’s kingdom to 
claim her. While the film Padmaavat not only portrays the Rajput queen as 
symbolically representing the nation, the eruption of controversies associated with 
the film before its release also shows how the female body is constructed as a site 
of a community’s honour in the nationalist discourse. The film narrates the 
transactions between Rajput kings and the Khaljis of the Delhi Sultanate. Several 
Rajput-caste organizations, including Shri Rajput Karni Sena, protested the making 
of the film. The film’s sets were also vandalized as the miscreants claimed that the 
film portrays Padmavati, a Rajput queen, in bad light. It was assumed that there was 
a song during which Khalji is shown fantasizing about the queen as an object for 
his sexual desire. Even the film’s director, Sanjay Leela Banshali, was assaulted on 
the film set. The protests were not limited to Rajasthan, where the Karni Sena and 
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Rajuts were protesting; there were multiple protests that were organized across the 
country. Bhansali and Deepika Padukone received death threats. A bounty of fifty 
million rupees was announced for whoever would assassinate both. The beliefs and 
psyche of the common people are evident from such protests. For them, the honor 
of a Rajput queen and the nation’s honour are one and the same, representing 
something that an outsider such as Khalji cannot be allowed to claim.  
Both the queens have been represented as embodying the nation. Thus, 
Jodhaa holds on to her duty and honor in adverse circumstances as the proud 
embodiment of the nation when she is banished from Akbar’s kingdom on charges 
of being disloyal towards her husband. She faces grave humiliation and shame 
when she has to leave the country; however, she willingly returns to the emperor’s 
palace after Akbar renounces the jaziya tax.73 Here love is an overarching concept 
because Jhodhaa compromises her dignity and self-esteem for the general interest 
of the larger society and nation. Film scholar Anustup Basu points out that “human 
(heterosexual) love is a unifying middle term which sets up an organic bridge 
between spirit and substance, between the particular and the general interest.”74 The 
film portrays Jodhaa as a character imbued with zeal and self-assertion and makes 
her as the active counter of Akbar. It is through her agency that the Oriental despot 
Akbar turns pacifist at the end and seeks peace even with the evil and rebellious 
Sharifuddin. 
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As already discussed in the earlier sections, one of the important features of 
the new-found Hindu nationalism is the construction of the image of ideal women 
as virtuous, chaste, without sexual desire, self-sacrificing, and Hindu. To make the 
image of women pure, Padmaavati is compared with the mythological characters 
such as Savitri and her journey to bring back her husband from Yumraj.75 One of 
the important characteristics of Jodhaa is her neutered sexlessness. Although 
Mahamanga, the overassertive nurse of Akbar, taunts Jodhaa for her sexless, 
transactional style marriage, Jodhaa, as the symbol of Hinduness, finds succour in 
a marriage that is binding and complete, meriting full submission even if it remains 
unconsummated.  
Throughout the film, Jodhaa’s cultural superiority is reflected multiple 
times, most specifically in her refusal to take recourse to Khula, the Islamic right 
of a woman to divorce her husband, offered by Akbar on the wedding night. 
Mubarki interprets it as “an act of defiance and an assertion of cultural superiority, 
aimed at rebuking Akbar and his cultural ‘Otherness,’ for while Islam considers 
marriage as a social contract between two consenting individuals, in Hinduism 
marriage signifies a bond that transcends time and space. If Jodhaa must hang on 
to her faith, Akbar must partially renounce his.”76 The film shows that Jodhaa may 
cohabit with the ‘Other’ if her culturally visible ‘spiritual’ qualifiers such as her 
dress, her culinary habits, her religiosity, and her samskar77  are respected and 
obeyed. Jodhaa emerges from the narrative as the protector of Hindu values in the 
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midst of a cultural onslaught, and becomes the embodiment of national 
consciousness. The character of Jodhaa dwells a middle ground and straddles the 
dichotomous regions of the Mughal Empire as the outer domain and the spiritual as 
an inner realm beyond the critiques of outsiders. In Padmaavat, the cultural 
superiority of the Rajput queen is obvious in almost every scene. There are many 
sequences such as greeting an enemy such as Khalji, culinary choices, and sartorial 
choices that portray the rich cultural heritage of Hindu Rajputs and which 
symbolize the entire nation’s culture. In this imaginary world of the Rajput 
kingdom, Maharawal Ratan Singh gets the chance to kill Khalji but refuses to do 
so because of his ethics and values of life as he believes that a guest should be 
treated like a god and that is the practice of a true Rajput. Sartorial choices are also 
highlighted multiple times through the elaborate costumes of the whole Rajput clan, 
especially through the characters of Padmavati and Ratan Singh. One can even 
argue that the lotus motif, which is omnipresent in the entire film from being in 
costumes to wall paintings, symbolizes the current ruling political party of India.78  
Vegetarian food is also treated as a source of pride and this is evident when Khalji 
is offered such a meal. 
That the nation’s pride lies in the hands of women is most evident through 
the glorification of the ritual of mass suicide, which is termed jauhar. Though 
Khalji’s army succeeds in defeating the Rajputs and capturing Chittor, it is unable 
to capture the Rajput women, who commit jauhar with Rani Padmavati. It 
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fundamentally propagates the message that the honour of the community or clan 
rests with women. If the woman cohabits with an outsider, the community’s and 
thus the nation’s integrity and pride are lost. It also inspires women to sacrifice their 
lives if they face similar situations to save the nation’s pride, encouraging them to 
see things from the perspective of the community’s larger interest rather than their 
own individualistic interest. Padmavati emerges within the narrative as a protector 
of Hindu values. Padmavati inspires other women to commit jauhar and in her 
speech she says, “In every age, a war for righteousness is fought between good and 
evil. Like the one between Lord Ram and Raavan, between the Pandavas and 
Kauravas and now between the Rajputs and Khiljis.” To encourage other women 
to sacrifice their lives, Padmaavi further says in her concluding speech, “Those who 
lust for our body, would not even get their hands on our shadows, our bodies will 
be reduced to ashes, but our pride and honour will remain immortal, and that will 
be the biggest defeat of Alauddin’s life.” 
The transaction between Jodhaa and Akbar is not characterized by any 
“Bakhtinian style of interactive, responsive nature of dialogue, or a mutual 
exchange of cultural practices.”79 It is very evident that the film encourages a one-
way acknowledgement that requires Akbar to adapt to the customs of Jodhaa, much 
like the right-wing rhetoric that requires minorities to adopt the majoritarian80  way 
of life. In connection to this, Tejaswini Niranjana examines the reasons why the 
film Bombay81 could not have had a Muslim male cohabiting with a Hindu female, 
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given the metaphorical association of women with the motherland: “the initiator of 
the integration process … cannot but be a man from the majority community.”82 
The films which narrate the story of inter-religious marriage of a Hindu female with 
a Muslim male marks her symbolic alienation from land, faith, family, and 
motherland, as in Pinjar,83 Kurbaan,84 and My Name Is Khan.85 
 
Representation of Muslim Rulers as ‘Other’ in the Context of ‘Love-jihad’ 
The films Jodhaa Akbar and Padmaavat are in the genre of ‘Muslim 
Historical’ which is characterised by its exoticisms of ‘Other.’ With regard to the 
Muslim Historical genre, Ira Bhaskar and Richard Alan indicate that “in the post-
independence Nehruvian period, this rhetoric had a special significance in 
upholding the Mughal era and as a valuation of Muslim culture that marked the 
secular credentials of the new nation-state.”86  In the context of the current political 
scenario, we find that contemporary Muslim Historical films present a different 
rhetoric than in the past. The primary factors of inspiration for the storylines and 
character development in the two films under our review in this paper are ‘Islamic 
Empires,’ specifically the Mughal rulers, and imagined love affairs. Jodhaa Akbar 
represents Mughal emperors as rulers who were known to be cultured, secular, and 
popular for their good governance and also portrays a generalized imagination of 
Islamicate culture, architecture, etc. It emphasizes the Muslim ethos, which is 
basically north Indian culture.87  In the film, the exoticism of Akbar is characterized 
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by the predominant cultural elements of language, dress, and music, which were 
clearly influenced by Islamicate culture.  
Muslim Historical films employ Urdu as the standard language of the 
Mughal rulers, and Jodhaa Akbar as well as Padmaavat make use of the language 
in the context of Muslim rulers. After Partition, Urdu has come to be designated as 
the language of Muslims, as it became the national language of Pakistan; also, Urdu 
was considered “as a ‘Muslim language’ due to its association with Muslim courts 
and its close ties with Persian language and literature.”88  Because of political 
reasons, Hindi came to be considered as the de facto national language of India. It 
was assumed that Urdu implies Muslim and Pakistan, and Hindi implies Hindu and 
Hindustan. But these Hindi films used the Urdu language as that belonging to the 
Mughal rulers to signify the existence of these historical figures beyond the nation 
state and mark them as the outsiders to or intruders of this country. 
Islamicate culture is reflected in these films through the costumes of the 
characters. Jodhaa Akbar and Padmaavat represent the splendour of the royal 
courts through architecture and costumes. Jodhaa Akbar displays elaborate 
costumes much like other Muslim Historical films. In Padmaavat, Rawal Ratan 
Singh’s character as the brave and noble Indian Rajput king is reflected through the 
extravagance of his costumes that befit the Rajput glory he is shown as upholding. 
On the other hand, ambitious and obsessive Alauddin Khalji is attributed a dark and 
ominous look because of his background as a nomadic Turkish tribal invader. His 
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character became a perfect counterfoil to Rawal Ratan Singh through the use of 
dark-coloured costumes, by being surrounded by women all the time, and due to 
his excessive appetite for meat. 
Though Jodhaa Akbar portrays the picture of Akbar as a secular ruler, he 
only becomes fully Indian by privileging the nation over faith within the narrative 
of the film. Jodhaa Akbar uses the strategy of the ideology of syncretism as “Akbar 
is shorn of all oppositional elements: the proverbial Mughal bloodlust, the famed 
Muslim propensity for violence, and the forbidden pleasures of the flesh.”89 He is 
subsumed into the nationalist order, and being nationalist, he indulges himself with 
the virtues of eating vegetarian food and practising monogamy and pacifism. 
Though he is also represented as the ‘Other’ through his costume and language: 
“his Otherness is rendered safe and assimilable, and secularism emerges from 
within the vortex of Hindutva – softer, but all-encompassing nevertheless.”90 
The representation of Khalji as the outsider is absolute in Padmaavat as he 
is shown asserting his connection with and tracing his ancestry to Afghanistan. To 
drive home the point even further, the film begins with a shot of a fort in the middle 
of a desert and the mise-en-scene of the world inside the fort represents the lifestyle 
of Alauddin's paternal uncle and the founder of the Khalji dynasty, Sultan 
Jalaluddin Khalji. He is shown as nonchalantly relaxing in the midst of a huge heap 
of meat, and is being chastised by his fellow mates because of his excesses. The 
film pits the great, brave, and virtuous Hindus versus the depraved and despotic 
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Muslim Khalji, who has an insatiable appetite for meat and women. Despite being 
an iconoclast and an expansionist, Khalji was a sophisticated speaker of Persian, 
who streamlined the economy of the Delhi Sultanate and is credited with having 
been the patron of the invention of two key instruments of Hindustani classical 
music, the tabla and the sitar. But the film never focuses on these positive aspects. 
Khalji is reduced to being the perfect example of cannibalistic, sexually depraved, 
and despotic Muslims. 
  
Conclusion 
Popular culture has always developed in response to a country’s political 
situation. The production of a self-conscious and aggressive nationalism in Hindi 
cinema recalls the idea of saving the nation by protecting the female body from 
invaders or the ‘Other.’ As the ‘love-jihad’ campaign considers women as the 
nation’s pride and the male members of the society as protectors of that honour, the 
same ideology finds reflection in Bollywood as well, which is often used as a 
platform to propagate contemporary political discourse. Popular culture through 
films such as Padmaavat encourage women to uphold their honour even if it means 
sacrificing their life to avoid being captured by the ‘Outsider.’ On the other hand 
Jodhaa Akbar represents a one-sided assimilation of Muslim culture into Hindu 
practices and showcased the cultural superiority of Hinduism. Most interestingly, 
in both the films, the spiritual sphere, which was represented by women, was 
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protected from the ‘Others’ who happened to be ‘outsiders’ as well, sometimes by 
portraying them as inferior or by vilifying the characters. This phenomenon echoes 
features of Orientalist discourse, which depicted Western culture as superior to 
Eastern ones,91 specifically, that of Muslims in the Middle-East. By analysing these 
two films, we can infer that Bollywood has created a space for popular historical 
perceptions which have been developed through a complicated process of 
interaction between academic history writing and political ideology. The 
dissemination of potentially distorted or fictitious representation of history through 
popular culture is strengthening Hindu nationalist discourse, and by doing so, it is 
also re-emphasising the narrative of how women can save the honor of our society 
from outsiders, much in the same way as the concept of ‘love-jihad’ argues. We 
find that Bollywood has contributed to the hegemonic Hindutva discourse through 
multiple representations of the concept of the Hindu nation and Muslim minority 
as a kind of Manichean rivalry. 
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